The proof follows from Theorem 1 in Fershtman and Pavan (2016; henceforth FP), adapted to the environment under examination here.
, and that, conditional on Á t ij > 0, Á t ij = 1 if and only if m <t is such that m s ij = 1 for some s AE t ≠ 1. Hence, at any period t Ø 1, the vertical types ◊ i can be uncovered directly from the bids b t along with the history of past interactions m <t .
The indexes are then calculated as follows. Let t Ø 1, and suppose m <t is such that the pair (i, j) oe {xz, yz, zx, zy} has never been matched in previous periods. Consider first the case in which the bids satisfy b t ij , b t ji Ø 0. Such bids reveal that the agents' period-0 signals were both favorable, i.e., ‡ ij = ‡ ji = G. Let v t ij = ◊ i Á t ij denote the expected value that agent i derives from interacting with agent j given agent i's information at period tØ 1. The assumption that ⁄ is close to 1 then implies that the period-t index for the match S t ij is equal to
where · is a stopping time for the process that governs the evolution of
, and where the expectation is computed using the bids b t to uncover the agents' "vertical" types ◊ and the "horizontal" types Á t ij and Á t ji , as explained above. Note that the assumption that ⁄ is close to one simplifies the analysis by implying that, no matter the two agents' vertical types ◊ i and ◊ j , the optimal stopping time in the definition above involves stopping when one of the two agents learns that the quality of the match is bad.
Similarly, if the pair (i, j) has never been matched and the period-t bids are such that
If (i, j) has never been matched and b t ij , b t ji < 0 then the index is negative; without loss of generality, it can be set equal to -1. Finally, if the pair (i, j) was matched in one of the previous periods, then the agents' match values are expected to remain constant, and therefore
The matches implemented under the truthful equilibria of the --auctions are therefore equivalent to those implemented under the "index matching rule" in FP.
Next, observe that the period-t payments, t > 0, in Condition (1) in the present paper, as well as the period-0 payments in Condition (2) in the present paper coincide with the respective payments in FP. To see this, it is useful to introduce some additional notation.
Denote by ‰ © (‰ t ) OE t=1 , the matching rule associated with the Pandora --auction. As in FP, such a rule describes, for each t Ø 1, the match implemented given the agents' membership choices, the current bids, and the history of previous interactions. For any 
where N ≠i © {z} if i oe {x, y} and N ≠i © {x, y} if i = z. That is, agent i's period-t payment should be equal to the flow value the agent derives from the match implemented in period t (as reflected by the agent's own bids), net of a "discount" proportional to the agent's flow marginal contribution to weighted continuation surplus, with the coe cient of proportionality equal to 1/-i .
Observe that the flow marginal contribution r t i , i oe {x, y, z}, can be rewritten as
When applied to the environment under examination here, the formula for the period-t payments, t > 0, in FT thus reduces to
Since W t ≠z = 0 all t > 0, the formula in FT requires that agent z's period-t payment, t > 0, be equal to
Likewise, when ‰ t xz = 0, the formula in FT requires that agent x's period-t payment, t > 0, be equal to
When, instead, ‰ t xz = 1 (in which case ‰ t yz = 0), agent x's period-t payment should be equal to
where the last equality follows from the observation that
The formula for the period-t payments, t > 0, for agent y is analogous to that for agent x, and hence omitted. From the above observations, it is then easy to verify that the period-t payments in (1) in the present paper satisfy the conditions in FP.
Next, consider the period-0 payments. For any profile of membership statuses◊, let 
Proof of Proposition 2
First observe that a matching mechanism is welfare (alternatively, profit) maximizing if it is feasible (meaning that it matches at most a pair of agents in each period, with the pair belonging in di erent sides) and admits a PBE under which welfare (alternatively, profit) is at least as high as under any other PBE of any other feasible mechanism.
The result about the welfare maximizing auction in Proposition 2 in the present paper then follows from Theorem 3 in FP. The result for profit maximization follows from observing that the weights in the profit-maximizing -≠auctions are such that
where F is the cdf and f is the pdf of the random variable ◊ (recall that ◊ is drawn from a Uniform distribution in the present paper). The assumption that q⁄ > (1 ≠ q⁄)L, along with the fact that the probability each agent i interacts with each agent j is weakly higher when Ê ij = G than when Ê ij = B, then implies that, when the weights -are the profit-maximizing ones, as defined above, the intertemporal average match quality (as defined above) is nonnegative for all vertical types, included the lowest. The result about the optimality of the --auctions then follows from Theorem 2 in FT.
